o Develop a coherent, communicable, synoptic overall view of any specific subject which can be used to illuminate and organise this objective knowledge.
o Make the knowledge useable by practitioners -to provide them with a powerful toolkit.
o Relate the knowledge to reality, that is to experimental and practical investigations. To use objective knowledge in this way, we must be able to create appropriate knowledge systems. Knowledge System: a structure in which multiple information frameworks and multiple forms of agency are combined in such a way as to make multiple forms of knowledge interactively available and useable. In particular, we can devise arrangements by means of which human agents and knowledgeable machine agents could work together effectively. The emergence of such systems will have a profound effect on education and training, and they will enable lifelong learning to become a reality.
Knowledgeable agents will become an embedded aspect of almost all manifestations of machine agency, giving help, advice and answering queries. They will become ubiquitous, encountered in almost every aspect of daily life in both embedded and autonomous manifestations. The limitations on the development of knowledgeable agents lie in the difficulty of extracting knowledge from human agents. Design activity will, in time, be carried out almost entirely by interactive knowledge-support systems/Vo whose refinement and extension will become of determining importance for industrial competitiveness. Such knowledge systems will also become indispensable in the support of teaching, learning and training at all levels". In such a knowledge system, the information characterising our knowledge of some specific object -say the Arc de Triomphe in Paris -will have three components: o A pattern and mechanism framework, comprising the raw information necessary to describe the object and its behaviour. We generate this information by seeing it, touching it, photographing it, measuring and drawing it, experimenting with it and so forth, generating as much information as is needed for our purposes.
o A conceptual and schematic framework, comprising a set of generic concepts and schemata related to this type of object -say the generalised idea of arches, the many ways in which they may be built and used, and so forth.
o A data and process framework, comprising a set of processes and their supporting data which give a detailed prescription of how that particular type of arch, of which the Arc de Triomphe is an instantiation, could be constructed; or, more usually, of how its construction could in principle be detailed formally, explicitly and precisely. (For most of us this prescription would be restricted to some general understanding of how such an object could be created, to complete the way in which we could coherently and intelligibly talk about it. Only in the knowledge system of a master builder would there be a complete and fully detailed specification of how to proceed in actually fabricating its components and then constructing it.) To illustrate how some of the parts of a knowledge system would fit together, and work in action, consider the legal problem of determining whether someone is guilty of a crime such as manslaughter or murder. This may be carried out in terms of a knowledge system with the following three information frameworks: o A pattern and mechanism framework, consisting of the evidence and testimony about the alleged crime, as collected and classified and available in documents and artefacts. o A conceptual and schematic framework, consisting of the relevant concepts and procedures on which the law is based, as interpreted by a judge and jury. o A data and process framework, consisting of the relevant and formally codified law, which details the appropriate processes to be carried out, how the relevant penalties are to be determined from the relevant data, and so on. To resolve a question of guilt then requires that the prescriptive application of the law be related both to the concepts for which the events which took place are specific individuations, and to the descriptions of the actual events and circumstances involved. It is important to note how the openended nature of the normal legal-judicial system allows all three information frameworks to come into play. This is because the formal structure of codified law contains exit points by, for example, referring to the concept of 'reasonable force' which must be interpreted by the judge and jury against the generic framework of relevant concepts rather than the prescriptive framework of codified law. Such a set of frameworks allows us to consider how human and machine capabilities can best complement each other in using knowledge. The analysis can be further extended by introducing multiple forms of agency, associated with idealised forms of agent, arranged in a hierarchy with each kind of agent able to use knowledge which is of a form available to the agent below it in the hierarchy. In addressing such a problem, you are dealing with different kinds of knowledge and, as we shall see shortly, these can be associated with different kinds of agency. When examining the collected evidence, looking at photographs, studying maps, investigating the detailed working of guns, considering the facial expressions of witnesses and their body language, and so on, you are dealing directly with raw patterns and mechanisms and so drawing on your accumulated tacit knowledge. Much of the knowledge which you are drawing on for this phase of your investigation is non-linguistic. When turning to the interrogation of witnesses, and when reading legal texts and having discussions with lawyers, you are using a different kind of knowledge -linguistic know ledge. Finally, suppose that your investigations require you to use a computer-based informationretrieval system to search through large numbers of legal documents and textbooks, using key words and phrases to define the search parameters. In this case, you are using the processes and data involved in an automatic computation. We can summarise the three information frameworks and the three kinds of knowledge involved by saying that: D Using a patterns and mechanisms framework requires tacit knowledge. D Using a conceptual and schematic framework requires linguistic knowledge. D Using the data and process framework associated with a computer system involves formal knowledge.
We can associate these different kinds of knowledge with different kinds of agency. The idea of characterising intellectual activity in terms of interactions among a hierarchy of agents is due to the philosopher C.S. Peirce 6 . Recently Rotman J5 analysed human mathematical activity in terms of a dialogue among such a collection of agents. The power and subtlety of such an approach is best gathered by reading the careful and extensive discussion of this topic given by Rotman. He defines three levels of agency which we will call the Person, the Subject and the Automaton. At Rotman's highest level of agency in this multiple-interacting-agents approach we have the Person. This is an archetypal human agent, instantiated in bodily form, living and interacting in the real world. Such an agent can deal with all the tacit knowledge, and all the sensory and non-linguistic information available in the pattern and mechanism framework, as well as with linguistic knowledge and formal knowledge.
At his next level of agency we have the Subject, which is an abstraction, an idealised non-corporeal humanlike agent which can handle only linguistic knowledge and other forms of formal, explicit knowledge. Such an agent is endowed with language, concepts and schemata, and can be thought of as the protagonist in thought experiments carried out by an embodied person engaged in intellectual activity.
At his lowest level of agency we have the Automaton, which represents a yet further level of abstraction, and which executes processes by manipulating symbols and mathematical expressions according to rules, but without endowing them with meaning. The sets of information frameworks, forms of knowledge, levels of agency, and the environments they relate to are summarised in the following table:
The agency idealised in the form of agent which Rotman calls the Person represents that of an embodied human being, living in the real world of everyday experience, and much of whose knowledge is tacit. The agency idealised in the form of agent he calls the Subject lives in a world which can be wholly specified in terms of language, and formal manipulations; and the agency abstracted in the form of the Automaton can be wholly defined by data and process, that is in terms of symbols and symbol manipulation.
Such agent-based knowledge systems can be used to analyse a wide range of knowledge use, ranging from human intellectual activity, as in Rotman's study of mathematics, to interactive computer-aided engineering design, where the agency of the Automaton is explicitly instantiated in computer software.
Much of our intellectual activity consists of thought experiments/ 5 ,9, and perhaps the best way of considering the agency of the Subject is as the protagonist in thought experiments. As a further illustration of this multiple agents approach, consider a highly experienced and skilled engineering designer using a computer-aided design system. Most of the designer's Human agency can be associated with an idealised Subject, who has absorbed engineering and scientific knowledge from a long and rigorous training. This knowledge is explicit, linguistic and formal, having been gained from oral lectures and written textbooks. The Subject's agency is enhanced by the agency of an Automaton, instantiated in the computer-aided design and simulation programs with which the design engineer can interact. But all the agency and related knowledge which are avai lable to the Subject and the Automaton do not suffice for the exercise of a fully developed engineering skill. This must be enhanced by all the tacit knowledge which has been gained by many years of practical and laboratory work, from observation, and from real-life experience. Only the full agency of the Person, which incorporates within it the agencies of the Subject and the Automaton, can handle all the complexities of the real world.
The extreme flexibility with which engineering designers can use computer-based interactive knowledgesupport systems seems to stem from the ease with which such a set of meshed frameworks, knowledge levels and types of agency are used simultaneously, slipping effortlessly from one to the other as required. Such structures allow us to consider how human and machine capabilities can complement each other best in using knowledge. In this context, the remark above about the "open-endedness" of the legal-judicial system is crucially important. Any accurate description of a knowledge system involving both humans and machines must show how explicit and tacit knowledge mesh together.
A machine can supply in principle any amount of infonnation, and so it obviously can provide an immensely powerful data and process framework. It can also provide very powerful support for a user's (or learner's) conceptual and schematic framework. This can be done with appropriate data and process in the fonn of structured (e.g. hyper-linked) texts, film, animation, simulation, narrative, interactively accessible databases, automated reasoning processes, and expert systems. A machine can clearly offer powerful help as an assistant to human agents in using knowledge. The degree to which it could function on its own is set by the difficulty of making the tacit knowledge of human agents explicit. The success of arrangements in which humans and machines work together will depend critically on a complete and coherent meshing of human and machine knowledge frameworks,joined togetber at the relevant entry and exit points.
Hierarchy of knowledge representations
The relative roles of naturaJ language and fonnallallguages used for communication with machines (microJanguages) play an important part in any discussion of human-machine interaction. It is in the nalure of a language that it bas a formal, explicit, persisting structure (syntax, semantics, pragmatics). Thus knowledge so instantiated must be formal and explicit. We call knowledge represented in natural language linguistic knowledge. Knowledge represented in a microlanguage we can call formal knowledge since such languages are much more rigidly structured than natural language. Thus we have a hierarchy of knowledge representations of progressively increasing logical depth (see the later section on "Logical depth"): Tacit knowledge l3 • 14 -memorably described in Polanyi's phrase "We know more than we can tell" -dwarfs in complexity linguistic knowledge, which in turn dwarfs in complexity fonnal knowledge. Tacit knowledge involves all the senses -sight, sound, taste, smell and touch -and all the products of our imagination. These non-linguistic aspects of a supportive environment for design and learning must not be forgotten as we grapple with ways of representing, storing, and transmitting knowledge.
Complexity
It is useful, and illuminating, to try to roughly estimate the amount of information which we absorb day by day. A standard single screen's worth of reasonably good quality video on a monitor display requires about a million bytes, or say ten million bits. For the acceptable rendering of motion this needs to be refreshed at least 25 times per second. If we could take all the sensory input we receive every second (video, audio, taste, tactile, 01 factory) to be a modest 10 times this, then a simple calculation puts our bit input over a period of 50 years at more than ten-to-the-power-twenty bits (J 0 20 bits These numbers must be interpreted with some care -we must always remember to distinguish between data and process. The bit estimates for the dictionary and the library are estimates of data whereas those for DNA are estimates of process. What is encoded in DNA is a program compressed out of data accumulated over billions of years. Thus anyone witb more than 50 years of experience to think about has to deal with at least 10,000 times more data bits than if they had to deal with the entire contenrs of the British Library. Thus you are able to roam around quickly, freely and flexibly in a storage system several orders of magnitude greater than if you had to search through the entire contents of that huge library' The power, richness and flexibility of the mental processes which enable you to do this are truly awesome. The size and sophisticated organisation of the pattern-processing systems whicb are involved currently defy detailed description. To be able to compare the size, organisation and functionality of different forms of agency, we need some measure of complexity other than a simple enumeration of the bits in encoded data.
Kolmogorov complexity
The quantitative theory of complexity8 is a valuable tool when comparing the functionality of different forms of agent. Chaitin has given an illuminating discussion of complexity and makes many and subtle uses of the concept. The interested reader is strongly urged to consult his collected papers J . For our present purposes it is useful to give one of the characterisations which he uses in his own words, and then use the term in the spirit of this characterisation:
The complexity of a binary string is the information needed to define it, that is to say, the number of bits of infonnation which must be given to a computer in order to calculate it, or in other words, the size in bits of the shortest program for calcUlating it. It is understood that a certain mathematical definition of an ideal computer is being used, but it is not given here, because as a first approximation it is sufficient to think of the length in bits of a program for a typical computer in use today.
Chaitin characterises a related approach by SolomonoffJ6 in the fol· lowing way: [lnJ SoJomonoff's model a theory that enables one to understand a series of observations is seen as a small computer program that reproduces the observations and makes predictions about possible future observations. The smaller the program, the more comprehensive the theory and the greater the degree of understanding. Observations that are random cannot be reproduced by a small program and therefore cannot be explained by a theory. In addition, the future behaviour of a random system cannot be predicted. For random data the most compact way for the scientist to communicate his observations is for him to publish them in their entirety. Cover & Thomas 5 give an illuminating discussion of Kolmogorov complexity and some of its uses. Kolmogorov complexity ofan agency is the length in bits of the smallest computer program which will instantiate the process which enables that agency.
Simple measures of complexity
While the Kolmogorov definition gives a sound basis for a quantitative theory of complexity, it is necessary to have other measures which allow one to make estimations in a simpler way. This is particularly useful for a rough and ready estimation of the complexity of artefacts. The design or fabricabon of any artefact can be considered as resulting from a sequence of decisions, which in turn can be reduced to a series of yes-no decisions.
Information in bits and the number of yes-no decisions which an agent makes are logaritbmically related. As N bits specify 2 N different yes-no possibilities, infonnation in bits is the logarithm to base 2 of the number of different yes-no decisions which an agent can take. (When using numbers of decisions as measures of complexity, logarithms can in practice be taken to any convenient base, since only a scal ing factor is introduced when _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Hartley Lecture -MacFarlane using a different base.) The complexity of an artefact can thus be estimated by taking the logarithm of the number of decisions involved in its creation. When considering the design or construction of a complicated artefact like an aircraft (see the section on 'The evolution of machines" in Part 3), we can, on the reasonable assumption that designers and constructors are working steadily at an average decision rate, take the complexity of the artefact to be roughly measured by the logarithm of the total number of working hours absorbed in its design or construction. Such a measure of complexity for an artefact can be regarded as a quantification of the agency which went into its creation.
Another approach is to consider the structural complexity of an artefact, where this defined in terms of the number of fimctionally distinct interrelated components out of which it is constructed. Each individual functionally-distinct part of an artefact can be called a technounit 4 . The logarithm of the total number of distinct technounits which comprise a complete working artefact is then taken as a simple measure of its complexity. Both of the above measures can be related to the basic Kolmogorov definition by thinking in terms of programs which specify design and construction processes for artefacts, and of programs which specify the fabrication of individual technounits. Simpler measures of complexity are also being developed for computer programs themselves in terms offunction points 7 .
Logical depth
Bennettl,2 has given an illuminating and valuable discussion of the complexity of an entity in terms which we can interpret as a quantification of the natural agency associated with its evolution. He calls this its logical depth. This is defined as the plausible number of computational steps required to prescribe an object's causal history. A logically deep object is one containing internal evidence of having resulted from a long computation, or from a dynamical process which requires a long time for a computer to simulate. An object or process is to be called deep only if there is no shortcut path, physical or non-physical, to reconstruct it from a concise description. In these terms the combined myriad processes which constitute human cognitive engines are logically very deep, and the processes currently storable in a computer are in comparison shallow.
